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Abstract 
Using a capacity-then-production choice model, we consider whether excess capacity results hold 
in a monopoly market with network externalities. We demonstrate that if consumers form 
expectations of network sizes after (before) the capacity-scale decision, the capacity scale is larger 
than (equal to) the production quantity. Furthermore, we examine the first-best and second-best 
policies and find that excess capacity results hold (do not hold) in the second-best (first-best) policy, 
irrespective of the timing of consumer expectations. 
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Theoretical and empirical studies of the relationship between market structure and excess capacity 
are important in the fields of industrial organization and industry policy. It is well-known that 
maintaining excess capacity plays an essential role as a strategic device in an oligopoly market. In 
particular, it has been found that firms maintain excess capacity to make their rivals reduce output 
levels or to deter market entry. Thus, excess capacity exists in a pure oligopoly market where profit-
maximizing firms compete with each other (emphasis added).1 If so, can excess capacity arise in a 
pure monopoly market where there are no competing firms and no entries? The answer is that it 
cannot. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not excess capacity results hold in a monopoly 
market with network effects, which implies consumption externalities (hereafter, network 
externalities). Using a capacity-then-production choice model, we consider how network 
externalities and the timing of consumer expectations affect the capacity-scale decision by a 
monopoly. In the presence of network externalities, we focus on the following points: players in 
the games are both owners of the monopoly and consumers, and thus, the timing of consumer 
expectations of network sizes plays an essential role.2 In particular, in a capacity-then-production 
choice model, forming expectations either before or after the capacity-scale decision affects the 
behavior of the monopoly. 
                                                     
1 There are many studies of excess capacity in various contexts, e.g., a mixed oligopoly market 
where private and public firms compete (Nishimori and Ogawa, 2004; Ogawa, 2006), a labor-
managed industry (Haruna, 1996; Zhang, 1993), and others. 
2 With respect to the timing of consumer expectations, we use the definition of Hurkens and López 
(2014), i.e., passive and responsive expectations. Following this definition, Toshimitsu (2017) 
considered how the type of consumer expectations affects profit and consumer surplus in a 
monopoly model. 
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The following papers consider the relationship between the timing of consumer expectations and 
firms’ investment decisions. Boivin and Vencatachellum (2002) examined how network 
externalities affect cost-reducing R&D investments in a homogeneous duopoly. It is assumed in 
the model that consumers form their expectations before the R&D investments. Naskar and Pal 
(2020) considered process (cost-reducing) R&D investments in horizontally differentiated Cournot 
and Bertrand duopoly and compared the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. In their model, they 
assume that consumers form the expectations after the R&D investments. In our model, where a 
monopoly provides a network product, we consider two cases of consumer expectations and 
compare the results of both cases. We demonstrate that whether excess capacity arises in a 
monopoly market depends on the timing of consumer expectations. However, the excess capacity 
in the monopoly market is socially insufficient. Furthermore, we examine the first-best and second-
best policies and that show excess capacity arises (does not arise) under the second-best (first-best) 
policy, irrespective of the timing of consumer expectations. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Setup: Monopoly in a capacity-then-production choice model with network externality 
Using the utility function included with network externalities presented by Hoernig (2012), we 





U q Aq q n yq y = + − + − 
 
                                   (1) 
which is subject to the budget constraint, i.e., 0 ,I pq q= + 0 1.p =  A  is the intrinsic market size, 
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q  is the production quantity of a monopoly, 0q  is the quantity of a numeral product, [ )0,1n∈  
is the parameter expressing network externalities, and y  is the expected network size. Based on 
equation (1), we obtain the following inverse demand function: 
( , ; ) .p p q y n A q ny= = − +                                            (2) 
Following Vives (1986), Horiba and Tsutsui (2000), and Nishimori and Ogawa (2004), we 
assume that the monopoly has the following U-shaped cost function: 
( ) ( )2, ,
2
cC q x x q= −  0,c >                                          (3) 
where x  is the capacity scale. Given equations (2) and (3), the profit function of the monopoly 
becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2, , ; , .
2
cq x p q y n q C q x A q ny q x qΠ = − = − + − −                 (4) 
As mentioned above, we consider games in which players are both owners of the monopoly and 
consumers. There are two different game structures depending on the timing of consumer 
expectations.3 In particular, the first case is as follows: at the 1st stage, the monopoly decides the 
capacity scale; at the 2nd stage, consumers form expectations of network sizes; and finally, at the 
3rd stage, the monopoly decides the production quantity. The second case is as follows: at the 1st 
stage, consumers form expectations of network sizes; at the 2nd stage, the monopoly decides the 
capacity scale; and finally, at the 3rd stage, the monopoly decides the production quantity. We derive 
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in each of the two games by backward induction. Hereafter, 
the first (second) case is referred to as ex post (ante) expectations. 
 
                                                     
3 In the Appendix, we examine the case of responsive expectations where consumers believe the announced 
production quantity of the monopoly (i.e., active beliefs). In this case, the monopoly can commit to the 
production quantity before consumers form expectations of network size. 
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2.2 The case of ex post expectations 
In this case, consumers form expectations of network sizes after the capacity scale and before the 
production quantity decisions of the monopoly. In the final stage, given the capacity scale and the 
expected network sizes, i.e., x   and ,y   the monopoly decides the production quantity to 
maximize the profit. The first-order condition (FOC) is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ), 2 0.q x p q c x q A q ny c x q
q
∂Π
= − + − = − + + − =
∂
 
Thus, we have 
( ), ; .
2





                                         (5) 
Under fulfilled expectations, i.e., ,y q=  equation (5) is rewritten as: 
( ); ,
2













  Given the FOC, because it holds that ( ) ,p q c x q= − −  the profit 
function, i.e., equation (4), can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2( ; ), ; ( ; ) 1 ( ; ) .2 2 2
c c cq x n x q x n x q x n q x n x Π = − − = + − 
 
 
The FOC of profit maximization with respect to capacity scale is given by: 
( ) ( )( ; ), 22 1 ( ; ) ( ; ) 0.
2 2
q x n x c cc qq x n cx q x n cx
x x c n
∂Π +∂ = + − = − = ∂ ∂ + − 
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2 2(2 )(1 )
A cx c n Aq
c n c n n
+ + −
= =
+ − + − +
                                   (8) 
In view of equations (7) and (8), it holds that * *.x q>  Thus, the excess capacity arises. However, 
without network externalities, i.e., 0,n =  the capacity scale is equal to the production quantity, i.e., 
* * .
2
Aq x= =  
 
2.3 The case of ex ante expectations 
In this case, consumers form expectations of network sizes before the capacity scale and production 
quantity decisions are made by the monopoly. Given the capacity scale and the expected network 
sizes, i.e., x  and ,y  the monopoly decides the production quantity to maximize its profit. Thus, 








  The effect of an increase in the capacity scale does not depend on network 
externalities. The profit function is rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2( , ; ), , ; ( , ; ) 1 ( , ; ) .2 2 2
c c cq x y n x q x y n x q x y n q x y n x Π = − − = + − 
 
 
Given the expected network size, the FOC is given by: 
( ) { }( , ; ), 2 1 ( , ; ) ( , ; ) 0.
2
q x y n x c qq x y n cx c q x y n x
x x
∂Π ∂ = + − = − = ∂ ∂ 
          (9) 
Under fulfilled expectations, i.e., ,y q=  using equations (5) and (9), we obtain the following 







                                                       (10) 
Equation (10) implies that the capacity scale is equal to the production quantity. This result differs 
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from that in the case of ex post expectations. Furthermore, without network externalities, the 
equilibrium outcomes are identical to those in the case of ex post expectations. 
Therefore, when consumers form the expectations of network sizes before the capacity decision, 
excess capacity does not arise in the monopoly market, irrespective of the presence of network 
externalities. 
We can interpret this game as follows. The equilibrium in this game is the same as that in the 
game where, given the expected network sizes, the monopoly decides both capacity scale and 
production quantity, simultaneously. That is, we derive the same outcomes as in equation (10) by 
solving three equations:
( ) ( ), , 2 0,q x y A q ny c x q
q
∂Π
= − + + − =
∂
  ( ) ( ), , 0,q x y c x q
x
∂Π
= − − ≤
∂
 
and .y q=  
We summarize the results from Sections 2.2 and 2.3 as follows: 
 
Result 1. In a monopoly market with network externalities, if consumers form the expectations of 
network sizes after (before) the capacity-scale decision, the capacity scale is larger than (equal to) 
the production quantity. 
 
In particular, excess capacity arises in the case of ex post consumer expectations. That is, an 
increase in the expected network size shifts up the inverse demand function (see equation (2)). 
Under fulfilled expectations, the expected network size is equal to the realized production quantity, 
so that an increase in the capacity scale increases the production quantity (see equation (6)). 
Accordingly, the monopoly has an incentive to expand the capacity scale over the production 
quantity to increase the profit, even if the adjustment cost increases. On the contrary, in the case of 
ex ante expectations, as mentioned above, the monopoly must decide both the capacity scale and 
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production quantity, given the expected network sizes. That is, because the capacity scale does not 
affect the demand, the monopoly makes the decision that the capacity scale is equal to the 
production quantity to reduce the adjustment costs as much as possible. 
 
2.4 Comparison: Which timing of consumer expectations is rational? 
In view of equations (7), (8), and (10), the following inequalities hold. 
* * ** **.x q q x> > =                                                 (11) 
Equation (11) shows that the production quantity in the case of ex post expectations is larger than 
that in the case of ex ante expectations. This implies that the timing of expectations affects 
consumer surplus. In particular, using equations (1) and (2), consumer surplus is given by
21 .
2
nCS q−=  Thus, based on equation (11), it holds that * **.CS CS>  This result implies that the 
case of ex ante expectations is not rational for consumers. Accordingly, the monopoly does not 
believe the consumer expectations. In other words, the monopoly expects that even if consumers 
ex ate form expectations of network sizes before the capacity-scale decision, they would revise 
their expectations after the capacity decision.  
Furthermore, the profits in the two cases are given by: ( ) ( )2 2* * *1 2 2
c cq x Π = + − 
 
  and 
( )2** ** .qΠ =   Using equations (7), (8), and (10), it holds that * **.Π > Π   The profit of the 
monopoly in the case of ex post expectations is larger than that in the case of ex ante expectations. 
Therefore, the case of ex post expectations is preferable for not only consumers but also the 
monopoly. 
We summarize the above discussion as follows: 
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Result 2. The commitment to ex ante expectations by consumers is not credible. 
 
Result 2 implies that the game in the case of ex ante expectations is not rational for both players, 
i.e., consumers and the monopoly. 
 
 
3. Optimal policies and social welfare 
 
3.1 First-best policy 
Using equations (1) and (4), the purpose of a government is to maximize social welfare, which is 
given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )22 2
, , , , ; , , ;
1 1 .
2 2 2
W q x y n U q y n pq q x y n
cAq q n yq y x q
= − +Π
 = − + − − − 
 
                           (12) 
 
3.1.1 The case of ex post expectations 
Given the capacity scale and expected network sizes, i.e., x  and ,y  the government decides the 
production quantity to maximize social welfare. Based on equation (12), the FOC is given by: 
( ) ( ), , ; 0.W q x y n A q ny c x q
q
∂
= − + + − =
∂
 
Under fulfilled expectations, i.e., ,y q=   we obtain the following: ( ); ,
1













 Thus, the social welfare function, i.e., equation (12), is rewritten as: 
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( ) ( )221( ; ), ; (1 ) .
2 2
cW q x n x n Aq n q x q= − − − −  
Using the above equation, the FOC of maximization of social welfare with respect to the capacity scale 
is given by: 
( ) ( ){ }
{ }
( ; ), ;




W q x n x n c A n q n x q
x c n
c A n x
c n
∂




                  (13) 







                                                      (14) 










                                             (15) 
In view of equations (14) and (15), excess capacity does not arise, i.e., * *.F Fx q=  
 
3.1.2 The case of ex ante expectations 
In this case, as mentioned in Section 2.3, the game of the sequential decisions of production 
quantity and then capacity scale is identical to that of the simultaneous decisions of them, given 
the expected network sizes. In particular, in view of equation (12), we derive the following FOCs: 
( ) ( ), ; , 0W q x y n A q ny c x q
q
∂
= − + + − =
∂
 and ( ) ( ), ; , 0.W q x y n c x q
x
∂
= − − ≤
∂
        (16) 








                                               (17) 
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In view of equations (14), (15), and (17), we obtain the following result: 
 
Result 3. In the case of the first-best policy, the capacity scale is equal to the production quantity, 
irrespective of the timing of expectations. 
 
In view of equations (10) and (17), when consumers can commit to the expectations of network 
sizes before the capacity decision, the capacity scale is equal to the production quantity, regardless 
of whether a provider is a private profit maximizer or a social welfare maximizer. This is because 
the provider knows that consumers form expectations of network size equal to the actual production 
quantity, whenever the expectations are rational. As a result, the provider decides the capacity scale, 
which is equal to the production quantity, to reduce adjustment cost losses. 
 
3.1.3 Comparison: Monopoly vs. first-best policy 
Based on the results derived in the previous sections, we easily show the following relationships: 
* *Fx x>  and * *,Fq q>                                             (18) 
** **Fx x>  and ** **.Fq q>                                           (19) 
Thus, we obtain the following: 
 
Result 4. Compared with the first-best policy, both capacity scale and production quantity in the 
monopoly market are socially insufficient, irrespective of the timing of expectations and even 
without network externalities. 
 
3.2 Second-best policy: Capacity-scale control and excess capacity 
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In this case, the government can control the capacity scale, and then, the monopoly decides the 
production quantity, given the controlled capacity scale. 
 
3.2.1 The case of ex post expectations 
In view of Section 2.2, at the final stage of the production quantity decision, under fulfilled expectations, 
equation (6) holds, i.e., ( ); .
2





 The social welfare function is rewritten as: 
( ) ( )221( ; ), ; (1 ) .
2 2
cW q x n x n Aq n q x q= − − − −  
Using the above equation, the FOC of maximization of social welfare with respect to the capacity scale 
is given by: 
( ) ( ){ }
{ }
( ; ), ;




W q x n x n c A n q n x q
x c n
c A n x q
c n
∂
= − − − − −
∂ + −
= − − + =
+ −
                 (20) 















2 (4 )(1 )
S
S A cx c n Aq
c n c n n
+ + −
= =
+ − + − +
                                   (22) 
In view of equations (21) and (22), it holds that * *.S Sx q>   Thus, excess capacity arises. 
Furthermore, even without network externalities, i.e., 0,n =  excess capacity also arises. 
 
3.2.2 The case of ex ante expectations 
In view of Section 2.3, equation (5) holds, given the expected network size, i.e., 
( ), ; .
2





 Thus, the social welfare function is expressed as: 
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( ) ( )22 21 1( , ; ), , ; .
2 2 2
cW q x y n x y n Aq q n yq y x q = − + − − − 
 
 
The FOC of maximization of social welfare with respect to the capacity scale, given the expected 
network size, is as follows: 
( ) ( ){ }( , ; ), ; , 2 0.
2
W q x y n x y n c A q ny x q
x c
∂
= − + − − =
∂ +
                  (23) 
Under fulfilled expectations, i.e., ,y q=  we derive the following outcomes in the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium: 







                                             (24) 
**
** (2 ) .
2 4 (2 )
S
S A cx c Aq
c n c n c
+ +
= =
+ − + − +
                                    (25) 
In view of equations (24) and (25), it holds that ** **.S Sx q>  Thus, excess capacity arises. 
Furthermore, without network externalities, i.e., 0,n =  excess capacity also arises. 
 
Result 5. In the case of the second-best policy, excess capacity arises, irrespective of the timing of 
expectations and even without network externalities. 
 
In view of equations (21) and (24), and equations (22) and (25), we derive the following 
inequalities: 
* **S Sx x>  and * **.S Sq q>                                           (26) 
In the case of the first-best policy, the capacity scale and production quantity are the same, 
irrespective of the timing of expectations. However, in the case of the second-best policy, the 
capacity scale and production quantity in the case of ex post expectations are larger than those in 
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the case of ex ante expectations. The reason is the same as that in the case of a monopoly market 
(see equation (11)). 
 
3.2.3 Comparison: Monopoly vs. second-best policy 
Based on the results derived in the previous sections, we easily present the following relationships: 
* *Sx x>  and * *,Sq q>                                             (27) 
** **Sx x>  and ** **.Sq q>                                            (28) 
   Thus, we obtain the following: 
 
Result 6. Compared with the second-best policy, both capacity scale and production quantity in the 
monopoly market are socially insufficient, irrespective of the timing of expectations and even 





We have demonstrated that excess capacity arises in a monopoly market with network externalities 
when consumers form expectations of network sizes after the capacity-scale decision and before 
the production quantity decision. Otherwise, excess capacity never arises when consumers form 
expectations of network sizes before the capacity-scale decision. Furthermore, excess capacity 
arises in the second-best policy whereas it never arises in the first-best policy. 
Even in a monopoly market where there are no strategic effects on competing firms and no 
threats of entry, the excess capacity results hold if consumers form expectations of network sizes 
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after the capacity-scale decision. However, the capacity scale is not socially insufficient. Thus, for 
example, a government should subsidize the monopoly to increase the capacity scale in a network 























Appendix. Responsive expectations case 
 
The case of responsive expectations implies that consumers have active beliefs around network 
sizes. In particular, consumers believe the announced level of production quantity and, thus, the 
monopoly can commit to the actual production quantity. The structure of the game is as follows: at 
the 1st stage, the monopoly decides the capacity scale; at the 2nd stage, the monopoly decides the 
production quantity; and finally, at the 3rd stage, consumers form expectations of network size, 
which is equal to the announced production quantity. By backward induction, we derive a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium in this game. As mentioned in Section 2.3, the equilibrium outcomes are 
the same as those in the game where the monopoly simultaneously decides both production quantity 
and capacity scale. 
Equation (2) in the case of responsive expectations is revised as: 
(1 ) .p A n q= − −                                                  (A.1) 
The profit function is expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )2, , , (1 ) .
2
cq x p q q q C q x A n q q x qΠ = − = − − − −                (A.2) 
Based on equation (A.2), the FOCs of profit maximization with respect to the production quantity 
and capacity scale are given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ), (1 ) 2(1 ) 0,q x p n q c x q A n q c x q
q
∂Π
= − − + − = − − + − =
∂
           (A.3) 
( ) ( ), 0.q x c x q
x
∂Π
= − − ≤
∂
                                         (A.4) 







                                              (A.5) 
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In view of (A.5), the capacity scale is equal to the production quantity in the case of responsive 
expectations. This result is the same as that in the case of ex ante expectations. 
Furthermore, using the results in the text, we have the following results: 
*** * **x x x> >  and *** * **.q q q> >                                    (A.6) 
Given equation (A.6), the following results hold: 
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